another zombie debate
there is another zombie debate atNeurath's Boat
here are the crib notes
A zombie scenario is one on which I would be making some mistake in thus projecting my imagined consciousness onto the zombie. Of course, many such mistakes are always to be expected, but this is not based on any of the usual ways of going wrong - If I think I'm imagining what it's like to be a zombie, I'm automatically entirely wrong.
I propose that what is characteristic of qualia is something like what Hume called "force and vivacity"; their tendency to bring associated ideas to mind, and enliven ideas. Within a single subject, phenomenal characteristics seem to experimentally track force and vivacity and conversely, absences of phenomenal content track absences of force.
It is, of course, open to someone to steadfastly insist that no matter how closely differences in phenomenal feel track differences in the functional activity of the mind. But it seems to me that at some point it becomes unreasonable.
Simply, If in a physical duplicate world the work consciousness does is still getting done, something physical must be doing the work and that thing must be consciousness. Part of what I mean by consciousness being that it's this state that does certain things.
here are the crib notes
A zombie scenario is one on which I would be making some mistake in thus projecting my imagined consciousness onto the zombie. Of course, many such mistakes are always to be expected, but this is not based on any of the usual ways of going wrong - If I think I'm imagining what it's like to be a zombie, I'm automatically entirely wrong.
I propose that what is characteristic of qualia is something like what Hume called "force and vivacity"; their tendency to bring associated ideas to mind, and enliven ideas. Within a single subject, phenomenal characteristics seem to experimentally track force and vivacity and conversely, absences of phenomenal content track absences of force.
It is, of course, open to someone to steadfastly insist that no matter how closely differences in phenomenal feel track differences in the functional activity of the mind. But it seems to me that at some point it becomes unreasonable.
Simply, If in a physical duplicate world the work consciousness does is still getting done, something physical must be doing the work and that thing must be consciousness. Part of what I mean by consciousness being that it's this state that does certain things.
posted by Genius at 1:51 AM
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